A proposition is a statement that expresses a judgment and can be either true or false. Propositions are divided into two basic categories based on their structure: categorical and conditional. Categorical propositions consist of at least two concepts or conceptual phrases, and include a “copula” that connects these parts. Conditional propositions are formed by relating two categorical propositions through a conjunction. As an example, the proposition ‘Whenever the sun rises, it becomes daytime’ exemplifies how two independent predications are linked through a conditional connective element. The distinction between subject and predicate fundamental in categorical propositions. The subject is the element to which the judgement is predicated itself, and the predicate is the quality ascribed to the subject. These propositions are categorized as affirmative and negative depending on whether the predicate exists in the subject or not. However, in this classification, not only the connection between the subject predicate, but also the existence or non-existence of the subject or predicate is decisive. Moreover whether the connection is actual (bi’l-fiil) or potential (bi’l-kuvve) has a significant impact on the verification processes. This study examines the logical structure of affirmative propositions, their distinguishing features from negative and “ma’dūla” (non-existential) propositions, and the constitutive function of the subject-predicate-copula triad. Employing the qualitative research method of content analysis, the study comparatively analyzes key classical logical texts, including: Avicenna’s Sharḥ al-Ishārāt wa’l-Tanbīhāt, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī al-Manṭiq wa’l-Ḥikma, al-Khūnajī’s Kashf al-Asrār ʿan Ghawāmiḍ al-Afkār, al-Abharī’s Kashf al-Ḥaqāʾiq fī Taḥrīr al-Daqāʾiq, al-Kātibī’s Jāmiʿ al-Daqāʾiq fī Kashf al-Ḥaqāʾiq, al-Urmawī’s Bayān al-Ḥaqq, and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Lawāmiʿ al-Asrār fī Sharḥ Maṭāliʿ al-Anwār. Drawing from these texts, the study evaluates the often-overlooked criteria of affirmativeness in classical logical literature from both linguistic-semantic and ontological perspectives. Accordingly, the study seeks to answer the following questions: Are affirmative and negative propositions merely those that appear linguistically affirmative or negative? Are affirmative propositions ontologically limited to subjects whose existence is evident in the external world? If so, what is the status of propositions that are linguistically affirmative but whose subjects do not exist externally? Can propositions that are semantically meaningless be classified as negative propositions? This research not only explicates the structure of affirmative propositions but also offers a systematic analysis of the linguistic and conceptual foundations of the distinction among affirmative, negative, and ma’dūla propositions. In this respect, it contributes both to the internal coherence of classical logic and to contemporary theories of logical meaning. Moreover, it provides a theoretical framework for integrating concept analyses from the Islamic intellectual tradition concerning propositions into modern logical discussions.