Within the historical journey of Kalām thought, the issue of human actions has been one of the controversial areas that has paved the way for many developments on both the epistemological and ontological planes. The debates surrounding the nature of the balance that must be established between God’s absolute power and human responsibility have not only raised theoretical issues but have also directly concerned the concepts of moral and volitional responsibility. In this context, Saʿdeddîn et-Teftâzânî (d. 792/1390), one of the prominent figures of 14th-century kalām thought, endeavoured to make a scholarly contribution to the details of the issue. Teftâzânî criticised both the Muʿtazilite approach centred on tefvîz and the Jabriyya paradigm of cebrî, developing a balanced stance that distanced itself from both extreme interpretations. According to him, human actions are subject to a two-way classification; the act of creation (halk) belongs to Allah, while the act of acquisition (kesb) belongs to the servant. In this context, according to Teftâzânî, kesb is a relative state that has no real existence; it expresses not the existence of the act, but its being determined. The acquisition of the servant manifests itself in the form of directing, choosing, and expending his power towards action or inaction. Teftâzânî did not merely repeat the Eşʿarî theory of acquisition, but endeavoured to reinterpret it and give it a more refined and consistent structure. Teftâzânî’s original approach is particularly evident in his linguistic and semantic analyses of key concepts such as ‘halk’ and ‘kesb’ in the Qur’ān. These analyses, which examine the linguistic contexts and layers of meaning of the concepts, show that he sought to approach theological issues not only on a theoretical level but also on a semantic level. In this paper, Teftâzânî’s theoretical framework developed in the context of human actions is evaluated in relation to the classical theological tradition. The study follows a text-centred method based on conceptual analysis, and a systematic framework has been established based on textual data. In this way, both Teftâzânî’s contribution to the relevant issue and his position within the tradition of kalâm have been determined. In his approach to the problem of human actions, the influence of al-Iji (d. 756/1355) and Fahreddin al-Razi (d. 606/1210) is clearly felt, as he adopts an attitude that attributes the public aspect of actions to Allah and the acquired aspect to the servant. Within this framework, Teftâzânî opposes the Muʿtezila understanding of the agent while developing a balanced perspective that distances itself from deterministic interpretations. According to him, the action directed by the servant’s power and will is ‘acquisition,’ while the creation of this action from nothing is ‘creation.’ Furthermore, it is clearly emphasised that actions outside of one’s will do not entail responsibility. Teftâzânî’s approach maintains the classical theological position while also bringing a critical and systematic depth to the issue.