This paper examines Richard Swinburne’s understanding of substance dualism within the framework of contemporary philosophy of mind literature. The fundamental problem of the study is whether mental qualities can be reduced to physical qualities. In this context, Swinburne’s theistic dualism approach to the existence of the soul increases the explanatory power of metaphysics, but at the cost of moving away from the ideal of explainability by natural sciences. The question is how this approach can be justified. In this regard, the paper analyses how Swinburne’s substance dualism differs from both classical dualism and reductionist materialism. The study uses Swinburne’s own texts as a method, detailing the structural analysis and intellectual positioning of the argument he puts forward. In addition, it presents a comparative analysis by evaluating critical approaches in the relevant literature. According to Swinburne, humans are beings with mental qualities and the capacity for thought. He argues that mental qualities cannot be reduced to physical qualities, and therefore humans possess a non-material “soul”. According to him, the soul is a non-material substance that is the subject of conscious experiences and, in this sense, is a metaphysical foundation that ensures the continuity of personal identity. To ground his understanding of dualism, Swinburne reformulates Descartes’ “cogito ergo sum” argument and advances his defence of dualism, which he calls the ‘simple argument.’ In this argument, he defends the principle that ‘having the capacity to think is sufficient for existence.’ According to Swinburne, the soul does not always have to be conscious, but it has the potential to be conscious. The simple proof argument has been evaluated through concepts such as phenomenal consciousness and privileged access. The use of these concepts has brought the debate to a more contemporary and phenomenological dimension. In his argument, Swinburne has suggested that a person’s ability to conceive of themselves as separate from their body indicates that they cannot be merely a material entity. It has been concluded that even if psychological functions are interrupted, a person’s metaphysical existence will continue. According to Swinburne, this study shows that mental events are different from physical events, but can still be causally related to physical events. Within the scope of the paper, this argument has been evaluated in light of the concepts of phenomenal consciousness, privileged access, and personal subject, and related to contemporary philosophical debates. Swinburne’s approach constructs a unique position in favour of dualism by arguing that mental events, although different from physical events, can still establish causal relationships with them. In conclusion, Swinburne’s understanding of dualism, unlike classical understandings, is grounded in a theistic framework that incorporates concepts from contemporary philosophy of mind and presents an understanding of substance that carries potential consciousness beyond the act of thinking. This approach offers a more balanced dualistic model than reductionist materialism, while also providing a metaphysical basis for the continuity of personal identity and the idea that the soul can continue to exist after death.