Emmanuel Levinas says, “The face of the other calls me to responsibility.” By saying this, Levinas means not just a visual or physical encounter, but that the other’s presence becomes an ethical call that transcends the subject. For Levinas, the face is not what is visible; it is an otherness that reveals itself without explanation, that cannot be represented, and that transforms the subject. Levinas seeks transcendence in the face of the other because the face is a possibility that dissolves the self-enclosed meaninglessness of existence, pulling us out of the loneliness of existence and inviting us into an ethical relationship with the other. From this perspective, encountering the faces of Afghan migrant women, who are rendered invisible on the social plane, is not only an acknowledgement of their experiences; it is also a call to recognize their rights, improve their living conditions, and take responsibility for the exclusion they face. Thus, the ethical relationship established with the face reminds us that migrant rights are not merely a legal matter but one of the most fundamental obligations of being human. Civilians in Gaza, migrants, murdered women, and abused children… Each of them is an “other” to us; that is, beings who do not resemble us, who lie outside us, yet for whom we nonetheless bear responsibility. According to Levinas, ethics is born in the moment of encountering the other. In his thought, the concept of “face” is the purest and most indisputable expression of the other’s existence; it is also the starting point of ethical responsibility. However, the faces of Afghan migrant women are often rendered invisible, unrecognized, or ignored in various ways. This state of invisibility leads to the displacement of women not only physically but also in the ontological and ethical dimensions—rendering the woman, in a sense, “faceless.” In this study, Levinas’s concept of the other is considered not on this strictly metaphysical plane, but as a site of witnessing to question the possibilities of an ethical encounter with the reality of the “Afghan immigrant woman.” The research was conducted with a qualitative and ethnographic approach. Structured interviews were not conducted due to security and privacy concerns; the primary data source consisted of casual conversations and unstructured interviews conducted with 55 women during field observations in the Erzincan province of Turkey between July 2024 and June 2025. Therefore, this study aims to build an intellectual bridge between social and psychological realities that remain unbridgeable, despite the fact that the issue of immigration has been addressed more successfully than in the West in terms of political practices within a Levinasian ethical framework. In conclusion, when evaluated within the framework of Levinasian ethics, the experiences of Afghan immigrant women reveal a state of non-recognition and invisibility at the ethical level. One participant’s statement, “I don’t have a country because I am Afghan,” reveals both the individual and collective dimensions of this situation. For Levinas, ethics begins with encountering the face of the other; however, as seen in this study, the faces of Afghan women are often not seen, thus preventing ethical encounters. While this situation points to a lack of responsibility at the societal level, Levinasian ethics, by making this lack visible, provides a strong philosophical basis for the construction of recognition, respect, and justice.